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Introduction
In terms commonly accepted by most legal experts, confederalism is an association 
among several sovereign States, founded on an international treaty and formed in 
the aim to organise the common management of a determined set of matters. With 
this definition we can immediately dismiss as totally incongruous the idea of apply-
ing the confederation label to the contemporary Belgian State, knowing that it es-
sentially follows the broad principles of federalism. 
Nevertheless, the present characteristics of the Belgian institutional framework 
authorise a degree of comparison, at the political level, with the confederal model. 
The parity of the Council of Ministers, which clearly expresses the essentially bipolar 
nature of our State, is the most striking example. If all the French-speaking ministers 
or all the Flemish-speaking ministers oppose a proposed decision, we find ourselves 
with a right of veto of sorts that inevitably brings to mind the principle of unanimity 
that defines the confederal model. In law, however, this is not a confederal charac-
1 This is the adapted text of a lecture presented on 18 March 2005 in a colloquium organised 
by the Centre Jacques Georgin. The papers of this colloquium are due to be published in the 
Cahiers published by this study centre, together with other scholarly articles on the theme of 
confederalism prepared V. de Coorebyter, A.-E. Bourgaux, Robert Deschamps and Philippe 
Cattoir. Since the time of this colloquium, the debate on the future of the Belgian State and 
thus on that of Brussels has taken on a greater dimension in public opinion. The fictional 
documentary "Bye, bye Belgium", broadcast 13 December 2006 on RTBF, likely played a role 
in this growing debate at least among the French-speaking Community (the testimonies and 
scientific contributions compiled by the director for this highly controversial broadcast can be 
found in his book: Ph. DUTILLEUL (dir.), Bye-bye Belgium, Loverval, Labor, 2006. We also 
draw your attention to the comments by H. DUMONT, "Bye-bye Belgium, une fiction révéla-
trice" (Bye-bye Belgium, a revealing fiction) in La Libre Belgique, 10 January 2007. But the 
debate on a possible break-up of Belgium extended throughout the population mainly after the 
federal legislative elections of 10 June 2007 and the difficulty in forming a new government. 
Despite these new events, we chose not to modify the initial tone of the text, which was inten-
tionally marked by prudence and strict respect of scientific methods.
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A b s t r a c t
This article looks into the future of Brussels in the 
hypothesis of Belgium's move towards confeder-
alism. After defining this term and making a dis-
tinction between its legal and political usage, the 
authors explore various scenarios that could lead 
from federalism to confederalism, showing that 
the latter is not a mere continuation of the former 
and that the path is strewn with heady questions. 
They then review the statuses that could be en-
visaged for Brussels in the hypothetical wake of 
such a move, and call for an interdisciplinary and 
citizen-based reflection in reaction to their analy-
ses.
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teristic per se since the ministers of the federal government, deliberating under the 
rule of consensus, have no need for instructions from the community or regional 
governments, nor must they answer to these bodies. 
If we listen to some players who use this term in its purely political sense, confeder-
alism takes on a different meaning. It does not refer to replacing the Belgian Consti-
tution with a treaty concluded at the initiative of the former components of the Bel-
gian State (or a portion of them) which have become sovereign and independent, 
nor is it an audacious description of the current institutional structure. Rather it des-
ignates an alternative model primarily based on the following four characteristics: 
accentuation of the current bipolarity by marginalizing the Brussels-Capital Region 
and the German-speaking Community, defederalisation of several sensitive powers 
presently held by the federal authority, transforming the mechanisms of inter-regional 
solidarity in order to reduce and condition financial transfers from the north to the 
south, and rewriting our present Constitution, almost "tabula rasa" in the aim to de-
ploy its Article 35 in order to limit the powers of the federal authority to those that 
are expressly attributed to it. 
As we know, this article 35 stipulates an inversion of the residual powers which 
would then be transferred from the federal authority to the Communities or the Re-
gions. Its entry into application is subject to two conditions which have not been 
met, one of which is the drafting of a new constitutional provision listing the exclu-
sive powers reserved for the federal authority. This could be the occasion for the 
political groups of the Vlaams Parlement who adopted the resolutions of 3 March 
1999 to fulfil their wishes. This scenario would effectively allow them to call for the 
devolution of all powers of interest to the Flemish Region in the political, economic 
and financial realm, and to maintain the advantages of joint rule of the Brussels Re-
gion. Many political actors, especially Flemish, see confederalism along these lines. 
Legally, it would merely amount to an intensification of the centrifugal trend reconcil-
able with preserving a single State, even if it were reduced to a hollow shell. 
In the remarks and plans of other actors, the same term nevertheless refers to the 
legal definition given in the first lines of this paper. This time the term indeed refers to 
the transformation of present Belgium into an association between several sovereign 
States, on the basis of an international treaty and formed in the aim to organise the 
common management of a determined set of matters. This is the hypothesis that 
we shall explore in this article. And this is the context –a legal revolution we must 
admit - in which we shall discuss a possible status for Brussels. The task is indeed 
perilous in many ways. Thus we set out on this task with a good measure of hesita-
tion and reticence. 
Is it the realm of constitutionalists to reason on imaginary scenarios which, although 
surely conceivable in the abstract, are nevertheless highly problematical? Pondering 
the future of Brussels in case of confederalism, indeed implies hypotheses such as: 
annexing of the Brussels Region to one of the future entities forming the confedera-
tion; its acquiring on its own of the status of a constitutive entity of the confedera-
tion; joint rule by the other constitutive entities of the confederation; creation of an 
“Europan district” status managed by the European Union itself... Some scenarios 
are certainly more plausible than others. In particular, we should not discount objec-
tions or reticence on the part of Belgium's partners in the EU who may oppose cer-
tain "institutional fantasies" the Belgians might decide together or in random order. 
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Nonetheless, it must be said that a priori the law neither precludes nor imposes one 
or another scenario imperatively. On the other hand, the law obviously has certain 
lessons it can provide concerning the procedure that would lead to adopting a new 
status for Brussels, no matter what it is. How would this new status come about? 
Who would decide? And more specifically: would Brussels and its citizens have a 
say in the fate reserved for them in a confederal Belgium?  
If we accepted to look into each of these questions, this is simply because the po-
litical situation obliges us to seriously envisage the hypothesis of an end to federal 
Belgium2 and to summarise scenarios theoretically possibly that could lead to this 
end, whilst leading to alternatives of a confederal type. 
This said – and we would like to stress this point – the discussion that follows obvi-
ously does not reflect neither an action plan – we do not have the responsibilities of 
the political actors – nor a set of suggestions de lege ferenda. We have limited our-
selves to a true exercise in institutional imagination, deliberately theoretical, on the 
basis of elements found in constitutional law and international law. We did not dis-
miss certain hypothesis on the grounds that they may be highly unlikely. We might 
say we simply identified scenarios that were theoretically imaginable, in the light of 
these legal elements. In any case, this is how we chose to interpret our task. 
The second motive justifying our initial reticence is theoretical. In today's world one 
can no longer find a genuine confederation, which meant that the examples desired 
or sought are few and far between. At this time there is no "confederal organisation 
model" that could serve as a benchmark. Of course we could think about the CIS, 
the Commonwealth of Independent States, that succeeded the Soviet Union, but 
legal experts have noted that due to the CIS's weak institutional instruments it is 
below the confederal model. We could also imagine the European Union, often de-
scribed as a "highly integrated confederation",3 but as a matter of fact it is so highly 
integrated that for all practical purposes it presents as many federal facets as con-
federal aspects. Or we could even consider all the international cooperation organi-
sations, such as the Council of Europe, which reflect the confederal logic. But in this  
case, instead of a model, we only find a range of organisations made to measure. 
Thus we lack a concrete example of confederation to which we could refer as we 
attempt to imagine what a Belgian confederation might be. The only examples that 
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2 For further clarifications on this subject, see H. DUMONT, "Organisée en Etat, la communau-
té est capable de prendre des décisions" (Organised in a State, the community is capable of 
taking decisions), in La Revue générale, February 1999, p. 29-38; IDEM, "Saint-Polycarpe ou 
l’impossible cohérence du fédéralisme belge" ([The] Saint Polycarpe [agreements] or the im-
possible coherence of Belgian federalism), in Administration publique, T 2-3-4, 2002, p. 314-
319; IDEM, "La mobilisation du droit comme instrument de changement du cadre national en 
Belgique" (Mobilisation of the law as an instrument to change the national framework in Bel-
gium) in Appartenances, institutions et citoyenneté, dir. by P. Noreau and J. Woehrling, Mon-
treal, Wilson et Lafleur Itée, 2005, p. 89-107. 
3 Y. LEJEUNE, "L’idée contemporaine de confédération en Europe: quelques enseignements 
tirés de l’expérience de l’Union européenne" (The modern conception of confederation in Eu-
rope: some lessons from the experience of the European Union), in COMMISSION EURO-
PÉENNE POUR LA DÉMOCRATIE PAR LE DROIT, Le concept contemporain de confedera-
tion, Strasbourg, Éditions du Conseil de l’Europe, 1995, p. 147. 
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are authoritative in general statehood theory date from the 18th and 19th centuries: 
primarily the Swiss, American and German confederations.4 
A third difficulty should also be mentioned, linked to the nature and effects of the 
legal norms that govern the highly hypothetical procedure that would lead us from 
the Belgian State into a confederal bond more or less replacing it. These norms are 
comprised of an unprecedented and complex combination of the rules of public 
international law and the rules and principles of Belgian constitutional law. The 
scope of the applicable rules of public international law and occasionally their very 
existence are debatable. As for the rules and principles of constitutional law that 
would have to combine with international law, their implications are just as equivocal 
in the context of such an exercise. The reason for this is obvious. These rules and 
principles were designed to build and ensure the functioning of a federal State in the 
respect of a certain internal equilibrium. But we now find ourselves in the situation 
where these rules would be diverted from their original intent, by seeking implica-
tions they may have in a completely different context: the extreme dismembering of 
this State.5 
We can thus see that, if the law and legal experts can surely provide some elements 
of a response regarding the consequences a possible (but somewhat improbable) 
confederalism could have on the status of Brussels, this is undertaken with a heavy 
dose of modesty, prudence, and in an resolutely conditional tone. And we shall 
adopt this prudence, modesty and resolutely conditional tone throughout this short 
essay. 
It is first necessary to discuss the procedure by which the Belgian state would come 
to an end, a prerequisite for the confederal hypothesis. The move to the confederal 
phase indeed requires breaking up the state framework and replacing it, if only for a 
period of reasoning, by the co-existence of independent and sovereign entities in no 
relation to one another. It is only after this disruptive phase that the sovereign States 
could agree in common to sign a treaty founding a confederation. In the first section 
of this paper, we will discuss the procedures that could lead to this dissolution and 
refounding. We shall pay particular attention to the Brussels Region, and ask 
whether it will have a say in the course of these virtual procedures (I). 
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4 In particular see L. LE FUR, Etat fédéral et confédération d’Etats (Federal State and Confed-
eration of states) (1896 thesis), Paris, Editions Panthéon Assas, reprinted 2000; Ch. DURAND, 
Confédération d’Etats et Etat fédéral (Confederation of States and Federal State), Paris, Librai-
rie Marcel Rivière, 1955; EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW, The 
modern conception of confederation, op. cit. ; O. BEAUD, "Fédéralisme et souveraineté. Note 
pour une théorie constitutionnelle de la fédération" (Federalism and sovereignty. Note for a 
constitutional theory of the federation), in Revue du doit public, 1998, p. 83 ; Vl. CONSTANTI-
NESCO, "Europe fédérale ou fédération d’Etats-nations" (Federal Europe or Federation of 
Nation-States), in Une Constitution pour l’Europe?, dir. R. Dehousse, Paris, Presses de sci-
ences po, 2002, p. 115-149. 
5 See N. ANGELET, "Quelques observations sur le principe de l’uti possidetis à l’aune du cas 
hypothétique de la Belgique" (A few comments on the principle of uti possidetis in the light of 
the hypothetical case of Belgium), in Démembrements d’Etats et délimitations territoriales: l’Uti 
possidetis en question(s) (Dismembering of States and territorial delimitations: Uti possidetis in 
question), dir. O. Corten, B. Delcourt, P. Klein and N. Levrat, Brussels, Editions de l’Université 
de Brussels, 1999, p. 220. 
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Next, assuming that the process of confederal metamorphosis has been achieved, 
we will then review some of the statuses that Brussels could take on within the con-
federal framework (II). 
I. The end of the Belgian State and refounding as a consideration  
In order to trace the highly hypothetical path leading out of the Belgian State and 
creating a confederation of States, we must address no less than four questions: 
1.Through which legal or political act would the Belgian State be dissolved or split 
up (§ 1)? 
2.Immediately following this dissolution, which political collectivities could claim to 
be sovereign and, thus able to participate freely in the ensuing process of re-forming 
as a confederation (§ 2)? 
3.Through which procedure could these political collectivities express their will to 
enter in one or another confederal structure with one or another partner (§ 3)? 
4.How would the borders of these new confederate States be determined (§ 4)? 
 § 1. The dissolution of the Belgian State 
A priori, five dissolution procedures are conceivable. 
First procedure imaginable: the unilateral secession of one of the present federate 
collectivities in virtue of international law, invoking the right of peoples to self-
determination. This first hypothesis can be swiftly discarded, for it is based on an 
interpretation whereby all people who hold in common a territorial setting, a histori-
cal past, economic and cultural ties, as well as political and social objectives would 
have the right to secede and form an independent and sovereign State solely on 
condition that this right is enjoyed by the whole population, for example following a 
referendum of self-determination. Contemporary international law interprets the right 
of peoples to self-determination in a more restrictive manner however: as the Su-
preme Court of Canada recently recalled, the right of unilateral secession can only 
be justified "where 'a people' is governed as part of a colonial empire; where 'a 
people' is subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation; and possibly 
where 'a people' is denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination 
within the state of which it forms a part.6 In other circumstances, peoples are ex-
pected to achieve self-determination within the framework of their existing state.7 It 
is also admissible that a people can exercise a right to self-determination under the 
hypothesis that it is victim of systematic and flagrant violation of human rights or is 
deprived of all representation or else massively under-represented in an anti-
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6 In other words, according to this Court, a people who have "been denied meaningful access 
to government to pursue their political, economic, cultural and social development"
7 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. In particular see A. BAYEFSKY, 
Self-Determination in International Law: Quebec and Lessons Learned, The Hague/London/
Boston, Kluwer Law International, 2000 ; S. SMIS, "Het zelfbeschikkingsrecht der volkeren", in 
Recht en minderheden. De ene diversiteit is de andere niet, Tegenspraak-Cahiers, Cahier 26, 
Brugge, Die Keure, 2006, p. 201-213.
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democratic and discriminatory manner.8 These circumstances enter into the last 
hypothesis cited by the Supreme Court of Canada, that of a people "denied any 
meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the state of which it 
forms a part".  
Obviously none of these situations can be found in Belgium. 
Second dissolution procedure that is conceivable a priori: unilateral secession by 
one of the present federate political collectivities by virtue of Belgian constitutional 
law. This hypothesis is to be discarded immediately since the Belgian Constitution, 
like that of almost all federal States, excludes the unilateral secession of one of its 
components.9 The large majority of authors acknowledge that renouncing the right 
to unilateral secession is a logical derivative of constitutionalism. The decree of 18 
November 1830, which will be discussed below, confirms this axiom. 
Third hypothesis: transformation of the Belgian State into a confederal structure, 
decided by a simple revision of the current federal Constitution.10 This third proce-
dure is also to be discarded on legal grounds. Indeed, a Constitution "cannot itself 
ordain or authorise the suppression of the State that upholds it".11 The “derived 
constituent power” (Pouvoir constituant dérivé) is allowed to amend the Constitu-
tion, but not to repeal it. And forcibly this would be the case if the Constitution were 
replaced by a treaty that was the exact opposite of the Constitution, which is a uni-
lateral legal act. In other words, the “derived constituent power” does not have the 
right to transfer national sovereignty which is the sole realm of the “original constitu-
ent power”: the Belgian people themselves. In Belgium, this argument of pure con-
stitutional logic is reinforced by the decree of 18 November 1830 by which the Na-
tional Congress proclaimed the independence of the Belgian people. Indeed, this 
decree was deliberately withheld from the constitutional corpus of 7 February 1831 
because the National Congress wanted to shield it from article 131 (later article 195) 
which regulates the exercise of the “derived constituent power”. This decree thus 
raises the independence of the Belgian people, and consequently the existence of 
the Belgian State, above the Constitution. 
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8 See "Report" by L. WILDHABER, in Self-Determination in International Law: Quebec and 
Lessons Learned, op. cit., p. 64.
9 The only federal Constitution that presently allows the unilateral right of secession is that of 
Ethiopia (article 39), but it is for this very reason that some experts have questioned whether 
Ethiopia is a true federal State, as its Constitution reflects more the philosophy of an interna-
tional treaty than that of a real Constitution. See P. H. BRIETZKE, "Ethiopia “leap in the dark”: 
Federalism and self-determination in the new Constitution", in Journal of African Law, 1995, 
p. 19-38. On the right of secession in federal States, of particular interest is C. LLOYD 
BROWN-JOHN, "Self-Determination, Autonomy and State Secession in Federal Constitutional 
and International Law", in South Texas Law Review/South Texas College of Law, 1999, 
p. 567-601 ; V.C. JACKSON, "Comparative constitutional federalism: its strengths and limits", 
in Le fédéralisme dans tous ses états – The States and moods of federalism, dir. J.-Fr. 
Gaudreault-Desbiens and F. Gélinas, Brussels, Bruylant, Cowansville, Yvon Blais, 2005, 
p. 161-168.
10 Under this hypothesis the Brussels-Capital Region would have no say, since the procedure 
to revise the Belgian Constitution does not associate the federate collectivities – and Brussels 
to an even lesser extent – in the constituent process.
11 O. BEAUD, La puissance de l’Etat (The Power of the State), Paris, P.U.F., 1994, p. 462.
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Of course, this norm could not keep the holder of the original constituent power 
from transferring its sovereignty to the components of the State, but such an agreed 
dissolution by the latter should be analysed as a constitutional revolution, and not a 
constitutional amendment.12 This case will be examined below in the fifth hypothe-
sis. 
Before we do this, however, a fourth hypothesis is worth noting: the unilateral se-
cession of one of the current federate collectivities. But this time not in the name of 
a right which, as we saw above, does not exist. Rather it would come about 
through a purely de facto decision based on political arguments. This hypothesis is 
less inconceivable than those discussed above. Indeed, although the right to unilat-
eral secession does not exist de jure, this does not preclude a unilateral secession 
being decreed de facto, and in the end crowned with legal success, in other words 
leading to the a new State whose existence, independence and sovereignty would 
be recognised by the international community. International law does not prohibit 
secessions, but sees them as events that can be recognised afterwards if they are 
successful. And this process has several precedents.13 It is all a question of effectiv-
ity. In other words, it all depends on whether the other States of the international 
community, and particularly in our case the EU Member States, accept to recognise 
the secessionist entity at the risk of angering the State from which this entity has 
seceded. 
We should add that the broad consensus among the UN member states is to "do 
nothing to favour secessions".14 In the EU context, one can state even further that 
such a unilateral secession would be very badly received: it would serve as an ex-
ample that might encourage other secessions in Member States such as Great Brit-
ain, France, Spain, etc. How could these EU members recognise any State(s) result-
ing from this secession without creating a precedent they would surely consider 
detestable?  
Nonetheless, we are obliged to envisage this hypothesis in view of the growing 
pressure from Flemish groups in favour of their Region seceding. This hypothesis 
would lead to a reconfiguration of the Belgian State outside the confederal mecha-
nisms discussed here. According to some experts, secession by the Flemish Region 
on its own, as it were, would simply leave the federal authorities – admittedly re-
duced to their components in the Brussels and Walloon Regions – the responsibility 
to ensure the continuity of the Belgian State amputated of its northern territory. This 
modus operandi would have the advantage of sparing the remainder of Belgium the 
task of requesting international recognition as well as applying for membership in 
the international organisations to which the Belgium belongs. This situation does 
however raise some questions that are beyond the scope of our paper. The proposi-
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12 Concerning our interpretation of the decree of 18 November 1830, the doctrine is not 
unanimous. See M.-Fr. RIGAUX, La théorie des limites matérielles à l’exercice de la fonction 
constituante, (The Theory of Practical Limits to the Exercise of the Constituent Function) Brus-
sels, Larcier, 1985, p. 54 and foll. This could be the subject of another paper dealing with this 
issue in depth.
13 In particular see the case of Bengladesh.
14 J. SALMON et E. DAVID, Droit des gens (International Law), syllabus U.L.B., Brussels, 
P.U.B., 2003, T. 3, p. 675.
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tion that, following a Flemish secession, the Walloon and Brussels regions would 
continue the personality of the Belgian federal State with a diminished territory, while 
the Flemish Region alone formed a new State, is in any case highly disputable. As 
Marianne Dony has pointed out: "international law does not contain any precise 
rules in this area: it is primarily political considerations – first those of the concerned 
parties and then other States – that determine whether the changes occurring in the 
territory of a State modify the State's personality or not."15 
Fifth and final hypothesis: partition, in other words a dissolution of the Belgian State 
that is negotiated and agreed with the assent of the various entities that make up 
federal Belgium. This scenario of divorce by mutual consent could invoke doctrine in 
its favour, especially that of the Supreme Court of Canada16, and also the precedent 
of Czechoslovakia. This raises the question, among others, of how the populations 
concerned could express their consent to this divorce. And neither is this matter 
codified by international law.17 As regards constitutional law, in our opinion the ques-
tion should be approached on the basis of the principle of national sovereignty 
granted by article 33, paragraph 1, of the Belgian Constitution and taking into ac-
count the above-mentioned decree of 18 November 1830 which made the inde-
pendence of the Belgian people a non-revisable constitutional norm. Consequently, 
as we saw above, it is impossible to dissolve the Belgian State merely through a 
Constitutional amendment. Divorce by mutual consent thus calls for a constitutional 
revolution, consisting of a "deconstituent" act that only the original constituent 
power itself, i.e. the Belgian Nation, can propose in complete legitimacy. In this con-
text, holding a self-determination referendum seems the most appropriate method 
to assess the Belgians' consent to this deconstituent act.18 
§ 2. The political collectivities that can lay claim to sovereignty after dissolution of 
the Belgian State  
The instant following the hypothetical dissolution of the Belgian State, which political 
collectivities can claim sovereignty and, in this capacity, freely participate in the en-
suing process to re-form as a confederation? Does Brussels have any chance to be 
among those eligible for these new titles of sovereignty? In an attempt to address 
these questions, we must first present a rule of international public law, the rule of 
Uti possidetis iuris, ita possideatis: as you possessed under law, you will possess. 
This principle was first used during the decolonisation process in the Americas: the 
newly independent States of Latin America accepted to have their national frontiers 
coincide with the administrative boundaries that had existed between the Spanish 
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15 M. DONY, "Conséquences en droit international et en droit communautaire d’une scission 
de la Belgique" (Consequences that a break-up of Belgium would have in international and 
european law), in La Revue générale, 1997/1, p. 91.
16 See above, note 6.
17 See J. SALMON et E. DAVID, op. cit., p. 670.
18 See H. DUMONT, "Réflexions sur la légitimité du référendum constituant" (Reflections on the 
legitimacy of the constituent referendum), in Variations sur l’éthique. Hommage à Jacques 
Dabin, Brussels, Publications des Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, 1994, p. 331-356 ; et 
IDEM, "La réforme de 1993 et la question du référendum constituant" (The 1993 reform and 
the issue of the constituent referendum), in Administration publique, 1994, T. 2-3, p. 101-107.
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colonies as the result of Spanish domestic law.19 The same principle was then ap-
plied to settle all territorial conflicts arising from decolonisation20 and finally the rule 
was lifted from its post-colonial context and transposed, in Europe, to settle territo-
rial problems that appeared with the dissolution of former federal States. In particu-
lar this transposition was adopted by the Arbitration Commission of the European 
Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia, the so-called "Badinter Commission" named 
for its president. In its opinion n° 3 of 11 January 1992, the commission deemed 
that, except where otherwise agreed, the international frontiers of the new States 
arising from the dissolution of former-Yugoslavia would correspond to the internal 
boundaries between the respective territories of the federate collectivities of the 
former Yugoslav federal State. The same solution was retained by mutual consent 
for the partition of Czechoslovakia and the dismembering of the former Soviet 
Union.21 
Before testing the applicability of Uti possidetis to the hypothetical dissolution of 
Belgium, we must make two important remarks. 
First, it appears that transposition of the rule outside the context of decolonisation 
ran into criticism from a formidable doctrine. The Badinter Commission's opinion 
n° 3 was, and remains, the subject of sharp debate. Thus, according to Prof. Jean 
Salmon, "the principle of Uti possidetis iuris, in the hypothesis of secession/
dissolution, only applies to the external frontiers of the dismembered State. On the 
other hand, as regards the new frontier drawn up between the predecessor State 
and the seceding entity, the former administrative boundaries are adopted as fron-
tiers only if the protagonists agree on this solution or if this solution is imposed from 
the outside through an agreement by the adjacent powers. In both cases, this solu-
tion is adopted not by virtue of the principle of Uti possidetis, by application of a rule 
of law, but as the result of a relation of force or of a consent – resignation before an 
insurmountable de facto situation."22 
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22 J. SALMON, "Les frontières de la Belgique lors de son indépendance" (Belgium's frontiers at 
the time of its independence), in Démembrements d’Etats et délimitations territoriales, op. cit., 
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Weerts sees it as the result of the supreme rule applicable in this area: agreement between the 
States concerned.
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The problem arises from the fact that States "do not refer expressly to Uti possidetis  
in their treaties or political discourses." 23 It remains however that we have before us 
a uniform practice: the transposition of the Uti possidetis rule was accepted without 
argument by the EU Member States who incorporated it in their policy regarding 
recognition of new European States. The question is whether this uniform practice is  
sufficient to constitute an international custom. As the international law expert Jean-
Pierre Cot writes, "we know that proof by opinio iuris is not easy. It is not the habit of 
States to affirm their respect of a customary norm each time they comply with it. 
They tend rather to apply custom as Monsieur Jourdain spoke prose. Without lend-
ing oneself to a paralysing voluntarism, we thus tend to accept (...) that a uniform 
behaviour constitutes proof of opinio iuris in the absence of proof to the contrary."24 
It is also helpful to add that Belgium, for its part, has never raised any objection to 
this point. If we wish to remain on the grounds of pure effectivity, this is undoubtedly 
the data to be retained, rather than doctrinal debates. 
Secondly, from a purely logical point of view it appears that the rule of Uti possidetis 
should only serve a highly limited purpose. It is only intended to serve down the line, 
in other words to determine the territorial boundaries of an entity whose sovereignty 
and independence has already been recognised.25 The rule of Uti possidetis in itself 
does not confer the right of sovereignty and independence on one entity any more 
than another, and surely not outside the context of decolonisation when international 
law does not designate the beneficiaries of this right. According to Nicolas Angelet 
these beneficiaries can only be identified through reference to the constitutional law 
of the predecessor State. In his opinion, "this reference is justified when the Consti-
tution of the predecessor State recognises the right to the secession, but not out-
side this hypothesis." It would thus be "vain (...) to state that Uti possidetis was ap-
plicable to federate entities."26 Nevertheless, it seems to us that in practice this rea-
soning, inspired by a linear logic, is up against an inevitable phenomenon of retroac-
tivity: an entity found on a territory over which, in application of Uti possidetis, no 
other entity itself can claim sovereignty will find in this situation a right to be recog-
nised as independent and sovereign. In other terms, the delimitations performed 
through Uti possidetis down the line, have an influence, further up, on the distribu-
tion of rights to sovereignty and independence. In quite simplistic terms, we find 
ourselves in a "chicken or the egg" logic where the consequences have a retroactive 
effect on the causes.27 
Bearing in mind this circular form of logic, we can thus attempt to answer our ques-
tions. But now we run into a new difficulty. Federal Belgium is not underpinned by 
just one category of purely territorial federate collectivities endowed with perfectly 
symmetrical powers. In fact, as we know, it is underpinned by regional and commu-
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cases where separation by mutual agreement entails prior identification of the principle's bene-
ficiaries.
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nity divisions. We can nevertheless make some headway by first identifying the fed-
erate political collectivities whose right to sovereignty seems less arguable.  
At first view, the Flemish Region and the Walloon Region could more easily lay claim 
to their sovereignty. But when we look closer, we find a difficulty with the Walloon 
Region that is not found in the Flemish Region. Effectively, the latter Region coin-
cides, as we know, with the Dutch-speaking region, whereas the Walloon Region 
contains not only the French-speaking region and but also the German-speaking 
region which coincides with the territory of the German-speaking Community. The 
evening after dissolution, it would be perfectly conceivable for this Community, as a 
federate political collectivity, to claim a right to sovereignty. In so far as it is part of 
the Walloon Region, for regional matters, it is hard to see how a possible question of 
sovereignty could be settled without an agreement between the entities concerned. 
And what about the Brussels Region? Several arguments, in our view unconvincing, 
can be summoned to oppose a claim by Brussels to sovereignty and independence 
over the territory of the bilingual Brussels-Capital Region. 
A first objection could be deduced from the fact that the Brussels Region, unlike the 
Flemish Community and the Walloon Region, is not endowed with what is called 
"constituent autonomy" by virtue of articles 118 §2 and 123 §2 of the Constitution. 
This objection does not go far, however, in view of the "sparse" prerogatives in-
vested in this notion of constituent autonomy under Belgian constitutional law.28 
A second objection might be drawn from the tutelage that the federal State can 
exercise over the Brussels Region in application of article 45 of the special law of 12 
January 1989 on the institutions in Brussels. This objection can be discarded for 
three reasons. To begin with, the tutelage in question is exceptional. It is not a “gen-
eral tutelage of opportunity” (tutelle générale d’opportunité) since it is only foreseen 
in four clearly defined regional matters and for special motives. Furthermore, it is 
primarily symbolic as it has never been applied. And lastly, it presupposes the exis-
tence of a tutelage authority, that is the State, which hypothetically would no longer 
exist. 
One final institutional particularity of the Brussels-Capital Region could also be 
evoked to oppose its federate entity status, and consequently its right to sovereignty 
(still within the limits of the circular logic presented above). This is the rule under 
article 9 of the same special law that submits ordinances enacted by Brussels to a 
jurisdictional validity control that is broader than the one for decrees. This third ob-
jection is no more convincing than the two above in so far as this control, in practice 
of a quite limited scope, has never been held up as liable to deprive Brussels of its 
status as a federate Region, and even less so because this control is even further 
reduced in ratio to the extension of the constitutionality controls entrusted to the 
Constitutional Court for all legislative norms, including ordinances. 
Conclusion: if Brussels is seen as a Region, its claim to sovereignty could not be 
seriously opposed. But a more delicate question is that of the impact on this claim 
by the powers currently endowed to the Flemish and French-speaking Communities 
in uni-communitarian matters in the territory of the bilingual Brussels-Capital Region. 
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Should it be considered that the very existence of these powers cancels any claim 
the Brussels Region may have to sovereignty, relegating it to the rank of condomin-
ium of the Walloon and Flemish Regions? With the effect that – learning a lesson 
from the International Court of Justice in the case Frontier dispute Burkina Faso – 
Republic of Mali29 - the fate of Brussels in the context of a confederal process would 
be settled, not by the people of Brussels themselves, but by common agreement 
between the Walloons and the Flemings? 
This question recalls the well-known confrontation between the Flemish and French-
speaking visions of Belgian federalism: a federalism essentially founded on two 
communities for the former, and on three regions for the latter. Is Brussels essentially 
a form of territorial extension common to the two large Communities, French-
speaking and Flemish? Or on the contrary is it a full-fledged federate collectivity, 
even if, by exception, these two main Communities exercise their powers beyond 
their basic territorial seat (i.e. the Dutch-speaking region and the French-speaking 
region)? In our opinion, several arguments weigh in favour of this second descrip-
tion. 
The first argument: The Flemish and French Communities only exercise some of 
their powers in the territory of the Brussels-Capital Region. In bi-cultural, bi-
educational, bi- “person-related” matters (matières “bi-personalisables), and in the 
area of language use, their decrees cannot apply in the Brussels territory. Bi- 
“person-related” matters, like regional questions, come under the powers of Brus-
sels, through the Common Community Commission (Commission communautaire 
commune) which for all practical purposes coincides with the Brussels Region. 
Second argument: recent institutional evolution reveals a further strides by the re-
gion and a slackening of the link between Brussels and the two main Communities. 
One the one hand, the French Community, under article 138 of the Constitution, 
transferred the exercise of several powers to the Walloon Region in areas concern-
ing the French-speaking region, and to the French Community Commission (Com-
mission communautaire française) for the bilingual region of Brussels-Capital. On the 
other hand, we have also observed looser ties between the Brussels Region and the 
Flemish community since the last reform of 2001, which abolished the seats in the 
Flemish Parliament for six Brussels Dutch-speakers from the Brussels Region Par-
liament. 
Third argument: the political collectivity that more closely reflects the concept of 
State is the region and not the community, precisely because the former, unlike the 
latter, has its own territory. 
From all of the above, we would be inclined to deduce that on the famous evening 
of Belgium's dissolution, Brussels could claim the title of sovereign and independent 
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§ 3. How would the three, now sovereign, regions exercise their right to self-
determination?  
If, following the demonstration given above, we allow that the three Regions are the 
entities that could claim sovereignty in the wake of the hypothetical dissolution of 
the Belgian State, we now need to look into the procedure these political collectivi-
ties could adopt to express their will to form one confederal structure or another, 
with one partner or another. We recalled that the right of peoples to self-
determination, guaranteed by article 1 of the UN's 1966 International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, does not confer any right to secession. It 
does however reflect the citizen's right to participate in public affairs and entails the 
right to freely determine the internal and international political status. Accordingly, 
the people of this State "must have the possibility to choose between different op-
tions, including independence"30 Once the Walloon, Brussels and Flemish Regions, 
hypothetically, have become independent and sovereign States, it is up to their citi-
zens, through their representatives or by plebiscite, to decide whether they wish to 
maintain their newly acquired independence or opt for one of the statuses dis-
cussed in the second part of this paper.  
§ 4. Determining the frontiers of the three, now sovereign, Regions  
If we allow the lines of argument exposed above, unless decided otherwise the pre-
sent territorial boundaries of the three Regions that form federal Belgium would ac-
quire the nature of frontiers protected by international law. Brussels would thus only 
exercise its sovereignty over the territory of the Brussels-Capital Region, which was 
delimited by article 2 of the special law of 12 January 1989 on the institutions of 
Brussels. This provision reflected the limits of the bilingual Brussels-Capital Region 
as determined by the coordinated laws on the use of language in administration, 
which in turn refer to the boundaries set in 1963. Without contradicting the premises 
that underpin our reasoning, we can nevertheless raise the objection that, in some 
aspects, these boundaries leave room for discussion. We are all aware that the 
1963 borderlines were accepted and later confirmed in exchange for guarantees 
protecting of the French-speaking populations who were often a majority in the 
communes adjacent to Brussels, and on provision that the electoral precinct of 
Brussels-Hal-Vilvorde was maintained. If the linguistic boundary was transformed 
into an international frontier, this could justify a request by the Brussels Region to 
negotiate with the Flemish Region in view, if relevant, of rectifying the borderline in 
the light of the results of a plebiscite enabling the people of the so-called "munici-
palities with facilities" to express their wish to join Brussels or Flanders. Indeed Uti 
possidetis is only a "discretionary rule that the States can waive".31 Although inter-
national law does not oblige States to take the will of its inhabitants into account 
when they trace their frontiers,32 nothing obviously precludes this possibility. On the 
contrary, the principle of democratic legitimacy should incite them to do this, given 
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that in any case the rules of international law on protection of minorities will have to 
apply on both sides of the new frontier.
II. The future of Brussels in a confederal framework  
We have just shown that the Brussels Region can present a strong case in the hy-
pothesis of an end to the Belgian State. But the points in its favour hinge on quite a 
few uncertainties, and admittedly a whole series of uncertainties. It is worthwhile 
discussing them before we go any farther, in order to circumscribe the Region's 
scope of possibilities as precisely as possible. 
The first series concerns the way the Belgian State is transformed, the modus oper-
andi. We have chosen to focus on two hypotheses: unilateral secession by one 
component and agreed dissolution. Although secession is obviously illicit under 
constitutional law, it is neither forbidden nor permitted under international law: se-
cession is the result of a purely factual and political process. The other States must 
respect the principle of non-intervention: they can merely "note the result of the ef-
fectivities deployed on the ground".33 Regardless the result, international human 
rights law will continue to apply.34 For any remaining questions, secession is a leap 
into the unknown. 
If the Flemish Region seceded all alone, would this lead to the continuation of the 
remaining State (if Brussels and Walloon Regions so wished), while the Flemish 
State applied for international recognition? As we said, the jury is still out on this 
question. 
Secession by the Flemish Community would be more problematical for Brussels if 
this Community attempted to take up part of the Brussels Region. Brussels would 
then have to secede from the Flemish Community, by presenting the arguments 
exposed above on the primacy of the "regional fact" over the "community fact". Or, 
under another hypothesis, the remaining Belgian State could attempt to oppose the 
Flemish secession. 
But one more secessionist scenario might also be added – where Brussels would 
declare independence first, ahead of the Flemish Region or Flemish Community. We 
must admit that this scenario, highly improbable politically, would have the advan-
tage of forcing the Flemish Community finally to make an unambiguous choice: it 
would either have to oppose this Brussels secession and affirm its attachment to 
the current Belgian State or else proclaim its own independence but knowing that 
Brussels would not let itself be absorbed by Flanders. 
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As we can see, Brussels would have a say under any hypothesis. Brussels would 
even be the core of the problem, which could be settled neither without nor against 
it. Indeed, all these virtual secessions would create conflicts that could be settled in 
only two ways: by the parties' mutual agreement or by force. Even if we must al-
ways fear the second solution, we can hope that the first would be sufficient to sta-
bilise a situation which the other countries would only need to recognise. In the in-
evitable negotiation leading to this agreement, the Brussels Region is invested with 
the institutional and political titles required to demand its participation as a full-
fledged partner. 
This is the case a fortiori even if the Belgian State ceased to exist following a con-
certed and agreed dissolution. 
The second series of uncertainties is related to the applicability of Uti possidetis. As 
we said, a large section – albeit in the minority – of legal doctrine argues against its 
applicability to the internal boundaries of a dismembered State in the case of seces-
sion or dissolution. We should also recall the logical difficulty we run into when we 
decide to apply the rule. Theoretically "Uti possidetis only enters into play after the 
new State is constituted. The aim is to establish the territory of the State not to jus-
tify its achieving independence".35 This new series of uncertainties, however, is not 
invincible. 
In the case at hand, in concrete terms after a secession followed by an agreement 
or a concerted dissolution, the only collectivities having the right to proclaim inde-
pendence are the Flemish Region, the Brussels Region, the Walloon Region (possi-
bly without its German-speaking region), and the German-speaking Community. The 
French and Flemish Communities are less well-placed to claim the quality of a State, 
as in principle this quality is understood as the exclusive control of a territory of its 
own. And these two Communities, through some of their powers, share a common 
territory – that of the bilingual Brussels-Capital Region. 
If the three Regions and the German-speaking Community, or one of these entities, 
tried to proclaim independence and if a conflict arose over the borderlines of the 
new international frontier separating them, it is hard for us to imagine the negotiating 
partners not referring to Uti possidetis if disagreement persisted.36 In all cases, and 
this is the essential point, Brussels has the right at least to demand respect of the 
integrity of its present territory. 
It now remains to review the different statuses the Brussels Region could adopt 
when it exercised its new sovereignty. 
We already pointed out in our introduction that there are numerous scenarios and 
that it is not the law's task to chose one or the other a priori. From a legal point of 
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view, anything can be designed,37 and Belgian constitutionalists have a truly fertile 
imagination. 
We should first like to summarise the scenarios that are theoretically conceivable or 
that have been brought up in public debate.38  
Independence. Brussels and its population decide not play the confederalism game 
and chose to go it alone.  
Merger. Brussels and its population could renounce their independence and ask to 
be annexed (in a unitary or a federal State) to one partner of the confederation or the 
other - Flanders39 or Wallonia. In the second case, the fact that the territory of Brus-
sels and Wallonia do not touch may pose some problems. The main problems, 
however, should be overcome thanks to the freedom of circulation guaranteed by 
the European Union.40 
Participation in the confederation. Brussels and its citizens could also decide to 
enter into the hypothetical confederal treaty with Wallonia and Flanders and to agree 
on the common management of some of its powers. But which ones? On this point 
the law has nothing to impose or exclude: the partners can share whatever they 
wish. The common powers can be minimalist (defence, some aspects of interna-
tional relations,...), but nothing precludes a more ambitious bond. One can perfectly 
imagine that the future confederal treaty would completely replicate the present 
rules governing the exercise of regional and community powers in Brussels, or else 
it could expand the facet of joint management over Brussels by Wallonia and Flan-
ders on the model imagined by the authors of Proeve van Vlaamse Grondwet.41 Or, 
on the contrary, it could loosen Wallonia's and Flanders's control over the manage-
ment of Brussels (on the model proposed by the authors of the Brussels Manifes-
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813/1, 2005-2006. 
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to42). Once again, the law has nothing to exclude. We should note that the last two 
scenarios mentioned (expanding or loosening co-management) could already be 
envisaged even if Belgium does not go the confederal route. 
We can thus see that confederalism is not necessarily and legally of a nature to up-
set the way each Region's powers are concretely distributed in Brussels, even if 
political upsets would be more than probable. The only change that, under law, 
would likely intervene in the case of a move to confederalism is that Brussels would 
have the permanent right of consent regarding its own status: the confederal cove-
nant governing this status could not come into being without Brussels's agreement, 
it could not be amended without its agreement, and Brussels would have the right, 
at any time, to secede, to "withdraw from the covenant" if it was no longer satisfied 
with its status. And this is the heart of the distinction between federalism and 
confederalism.43 
Confederal district. In his 1955 work on confederations of States, Charles Durand 
noted that nothing in the legal definition of confederalism precluded a territory being 
withdrawn from the control of each of the confederations constituent unities in the 
aim to establish the capital of this confederation, which would be home to its bodies 
and, if relevant, the seats of the constituent unities' powers44 In other terms, the 
"federal district" model, the prime example of which is Washington D.C., 45 could be 
transposed in the confederal framework:46 the "confederal district" would thus be 
administered directly by the confederate bodies. This model could be chosen for 
Brussels, as long as the people of Brussels agreed. This model is often criticised on 
the grounds that it relegates its inhabitants to the level of second-class citizens. It is 
true that the residents of the District of Columbia are not adequately represented in 
Congress, which nevertheless has authority over the area. The law, however, pre-
sents other paths more respectful of the rights of the district's residents: a few ex-
amples (although in federal States) are Canberra, Brasilia, or even New Delhi. Under 
the confederal district hypothesis, the people of Brussels would be deprived of the 
right to participate in the affairs of a true State, a hardly enviable position for all who 
are still firm believers in the "citizen's profession". 
Brussels Studies
the e-journal for academic research on Brussels
 17
42 The "Manifestobru" association prepared two manifestos along these lines. The first dates 
from 4 February 2003 and the second, prepared in collaboration with the groups "Aula Magna" 
and "bruXsel.org", following the appeal Nous existons, Wij bestaan, We exist, dates from 23 
May 2007. The texts can be found on www.manifestobru.be. For a synthesis of their thoughts 
see especially A. MASKENS, "Les Bruxellois doivent abandonner le clivage linguistique" (The 
people of Brussels must abandon the language split), in Le Soir, 10 March 2006. 
43 See Ch. DURAND, op. cit., p. 86-87 et 167.
44 See ibidem, p. 31.
45 On this model see the above mentioned study by C. VAN WYNSBERGHE. 
46 The Flemish reflection group In de Warande suggests drawing from a portion of this model 
to imagine a status that would place Brussels under the supervision of two independent 
States, Flanders and Wallonia (condominium technique), until the time Brussels becomes the 
capital of the European: See Manifeste pour une Flandre indépendante dans l’Europe unie 
(Manifesto for an independent Flances in the united Europe), Brussels, Reflection Group "In de 
Warande", 2006, p. 201-212. 
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European district. This idea was launched a few years ago:47 turning Brussels into a 
European district, directly administered by the European Union. As long as the peo-
ple of Brussels agree, this solution is perfectly feasible from the legal point of view. 
But it must also be realistic, and this is grounds for misgivings by the most informed 
commentators on both sides of the language border. The sovereignty – penal, fiscal 
or other – that the EU would be asked to exercise over Brussels would require noth-
ing less than the EU itself becoming a full-fledged State. It is hard to imagine the 27 
Members States ready to turn the EU's legal status on its head...48 
As we can see, the scenarios are multiple and this brief summary in no way de-
pletes the legal imagination. Come what may, however, the particularity of these 
hypotheses lies in the fact that they cannot come about without Brussels's voluntary 
adhesion. This required consent means that some scenarios are certainly more im-
probable than others, all the more so that, a priori, we see no motives that would 
incite a group of citizens to renounce their endowed right to self-determination by 
placing themselves under the dictate of others. 
Conclusions 
By taking seriously the hypothesis of a confederal revolution, necessary for this ex-
ercise, and by restricting ourselves to strictly legal reasoning, we were defending 
two ideas, without masking the many uncertainties that surrounded them. 
The first: during the procedure to dissolve the Belgian State - a prerequisite for a 
new confederal form - Brussels and its citizens would conquer the right to decide 
their fate for themselves. In this area, our analysis, minus the bitter tone, converges 
with the observation made by Marc Platel in his recent Communautaire geschie-
denis van België: "Even in the framework of a confederal model, elaborating a more 
or less acceptable solution for the capital of Flanders is not necessarily all that easy. 
And even less so since, even on the Flemish side, there was consent to an evolution 
whereby the people of Brussels themselves have been given the practically exclu-
sive right decide on their own political organisation."49 
The second: in law, all options are open regarding the use the people of Brussels 
would wish to make of their new sovereignty: from independence to consented an-
nexation, with a middle grounds of a hypothetical confederation in a framework to 
be negotiated with its partner States. With one reservation it is important to high-
light: the rights of the Dutch-speaking minority of Brussels obviously must be guar-
anteed in complete conformity with the international standards in this area. 
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47 In particular by L. TOBBACK in November 1997 . 
48 See Chr. FRANCK et F. DELMARTINO, "Brussels, l’Union européenne et le ‘scénario eu-
ropéen’" (Brussels, the European Union and the "European scenario"), in Brussels et son statut 
(Brussels and its status), E. Witte, A. Alen, H. Dumont, R. Ergec (dir.), Brussels, Larcier, 1999, 
p. 721-742.
49 M. PLATEL, Communautaire geschiedenis van België van 1830 tot vandaag, Leuven, 
Davidsfonds, 2004. 
Hugues Dumont and Sébastien Van Drooghenbroeck, “The status of Brussels in the hypothesis of confederalism,
Brussels Studies, issue 10, 2007 october the 15th, www.brusselsstudies.be
Despite the firmness of these two ideas, we should like to again stress the modest, 
prudent and resolutely conditional tone we wished to adopt regarding all the devel-
opments that led us to formulate them. This paper is simply a first attempt in a re-
flection that well deserves further deepening, continuation, and especially discus-
sion. The primary worth we hope to see acknowledged would be that of contribut-
ing to the indispensable debate on the questions it raises, a debate in which the 
urgent participation is needed not only by constitutional and international law ex-
perts, political scientists and economists,50 but also by the organisations and citi-
zens of Belgian civil society. 
For the technical aspects, it is mainly a dialogue with specialists in international law 
that we would like to encourage, since we are aware of the limits of the constitu-
tional law discipline in matters concerning the dismembering of a State and a possi-
ble reforming of its constituent units under a confederal structure which, by defini-
tion, is covered by international law.
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50 On this subject we should cite the quality of the journalism done on these questions with the 
collaboration of several Flemish scholars by De Standaard in its edition of 1-2 September 
2007. 
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